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Abstract 
 
Zimbabwe faces growth and external competitiveness challenges, as indicated by its low trend 
growth and investment, declining share in the world exports, high current account deficits, and 
external debt. The stock-flow approach to the equilibrium exchange rate reveals that the real 
exchange rate experienced periods of sizeable overvaluation, both prior to the 2008 economic 
collapse and under the current multicurrency regime. While overvaluation hampers GDP growth, 
as well as growth and employment in export sectors, we have not found that undervaluation would 
raise it. Replacing the multicurrency regime anchored in the US$ by the South African rand as the 
sole transaction currency would help reduce overvaluation and stimulate exports and growth. 
Under any currency regime, Zimbabwe needs to adhere to sound macroeconomic policies, avoid 
overspending on public wages, and create environment conducive for investment. 
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I. Introduction 
 
After its economy collapsed in 2008, Zimbabwe opted for a multicurrency regime anchored in 
US$.2 The objective was to stabilize the economy and establish a credible nominal anchor.3 The 
replacement of the Zimbabwean dollar by the multicurrency system brought the hyperinflation and 
the currency devaluation to a halt, laying foundations for economic recovery. The average annual 
inflation during 2009 – 2013 was 3.3 percent, while the real GDP grew on average more than 8 
percent a year. While it may be tempting to consider these outcomes a success, a closer look at the 
overall economic performance reveals a number of challenges and open issues. 
 
One of them is external competitiveness and the extent to which an overvalued currency has 
contributed to the sluggish growth. Concerns about the limited external competitiveness have 
prevailed for some time given the country’s declining global export shares, widening trade deficits, 
and high concentration of exports to South Africa. The role of the real exchange misalignment in 
the 2008 currency crisis in 2008 was also underscored (Ndlela, 2012).  
 
This paper aims to find out whether (i) currency overvaluation prevailed under the multicurrency 
regime introduced in 2008 and (ii) the overvaluation may have contributed to the Zimbabwe’s long 
term weak external and growth performance. Further, some recent literature (Gala and Lucinda, 
2006; Rodrik, 2008; Rapetti et al., 2012) posits that undervalued real exchange rates can stimulate 
growth, and we examine if this is the case in Zimbabwe. The stock-flow approach to the real 
equilibrium exchange rate reveals that Zimbabwe experienced large currency overvaluation 
relative to the South African rand both in the run up to the 2008 collapse and in recent years, with 
negative impact on GDP growth, exports and productive employment. We do not find a robust 
evidence that currency undervaluation would boost growth.  
 
With South Africa as the largest trading partner, Zimbabwe would benefit from implementing 
internal devaluation (and in particular contain wage cost) and accelerating structural reforms to 
correct for the current overvaluation of bilateral real exchange rate (RER) with South Africa. 
Policymakers should also consider replacing multi-currency regime (anchored in US$) by the 
South African rand. Such reform would help prevent major future RER overvaluations, reduce 
transaction costs, improve price transparency, and stimulate growth and the agricultural sector.    
 
The paper is organized as follows. After this Introduction, Section II discusses key external sector 
developments. Section III estimates the equilibrium exchange rate and discusses findings. Section 
IV makes the case for adopting South Africa rand. Section V concludes. 
  
II. Growth and External Sector Performance of Zimbabwe 
 
The weak economic performance of Zimbabwe has been analyzed from both microeconomic and 
macroeconomic perspectives. In this paper, we adopt the longer term macroeconomic perspective 
by examining links between the RER, productivity, net foreign liabilities and growth. 
                                                          
2 The real GDP declined by 14 % in 2008, after a 40 % cumulative decline in 2000 – 2007. 70 % of the population 
needed food assistance in 2008. The government revenues and expenditures collapsed that year (IMF, 2009).  
3 The rand was to be the reference currency, but US$ became one. Budgets are prepared in US$ and 4/5 of non-cash 
transactions are carried out in US$. In cash transactions, rand is used in the south (Kramarenko et al., 2010).  
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a. Growth and its Drivers  
 
Since mid-1990s, Zimbabwe has been one of the slow growing countries in Africa. This track 
record followed a period of solid growth (about 4 percent a year on average) during the 1980s, 
with the rising share of manufacturing in exports. However, in part due to drought spells, the 
growth slowed to 1.9 percent a year on average during 1991 – 1996, with manufacturing 
contracting by 1.7 percent a year (IMF, 2001). Following the overall policy reversal in the late 
1990s, growth became negative until 2008, and accompanied by hyper-inflation and currency 
crisis in 2008. During this period, the country’s productivity gap with South Africa widened. 
Zimbabwe’s growth performance was also well below the Africa continent (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Real GDP Growth and Real GDP per capita in Zimbabwe and South Africa 
 
1a. Real GDP Growth    1b. Real GDP per capita  
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB database. Note: In Figure 1b real GDP per capita is measured as 
log of GDP in constant 2005 $. Due to the lack of employment data, productivity is proxied as real GDP per capita.  
 
Among sectors, mining and services contributed the most to the real output growth during 1981 – 
2012 (Table 1a). In contrast, contribution of agriculture and manufacturing was very limited. With 
the introduction of the multicurrency regime and stabilization of the macroeconomic situation, 
growth has become more broad-based. Still, growth of manufacturing has been lagging those of 
other sectors. As a result, the share of manufacturing declined steadily from 9 percent of total value 
added (in constant 2005 US$) to about 7 percent in 2012. 
 
 On the demand side, growth has been driven mostly by household consumption, with negative 
contribution from net exports. The contribution of gross exports was also negative for most of 
1980 – 2012, but a notable turnaround occurred after 2008, with a strong revival of mining and 
commodity exports (Table 1a and 1b). The household demand continues to be fueled in part driven 
by public sector wages, which in 2014 are projected to amount to more than 16 percent of GDP 
and almost 2/3 of budgetary outlays (IMF, 2014). Remittances fueled household expanses in the 
past, but since most are sent by emigrants to South Africa, the weakened rand has eroded their 
purchasing power. The share of total investment in GDP is low, hampering trend growth. 
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Table 1. Drivers of real GDP growth, 1981 – 2012 
 
1a. Sectoral Drivers of Growth (in percent of value added in 2005 US$) 
  Growth Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Services 
1981 - 2012 1.4 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.6 
2001 - 2012 0.3 -0.3 0.8 0.0 -0.2 
2009 - 2012 10.4 1.4 5.5 0.7 2.8 
 
1b. Demand-side drivers of growth (in percent of GDP in 2005 US$) 
  Growth Household Government Investment Net Exports Gross Exports 
1981 - 2012 2.1 2.9 0.3 0.0 -1.2 1.6 
2001 - 2012 2.4 6.2 0.5 -0.1 -4.2 -4.2 
2009 - 2012 10.5 14.6 2.7 0.3 -7.1 13.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB database.  
 
b. Export Performance 
 
i. High current account deficits and external debt 
 
Zimbabwe’s trade and current account deficits deteriorated from the early to mid-2000s, with a 
rapid worsening in the crisis year of 2008. The twin deficits remained very high in 2013. Trade 
has been driving the current account balance outcomes, underscoring the importance of external 
competitiveness. The current account deficit has been increasingly financed by short term private 
loans or arrears, leading to accumulation of private external debt and exacerbating the overall 
external debt and arrears challenge (Figure 2). At the same time, the reserve coverage has reach 
precarious levels, covering about 2 weeks of imports of goods and services. 
 
Figure 2. Zimbabwe: External sector indicators (% of GDP) 
 
2a. Trade and current account deficits       2b. External debt, private and public 
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Source: AfDB and IMF WEO database. Note: Negative balance in 2a indicates deficit.  
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ii. Export growth and market share 
 
The total exports grew at high rate during the 1990s, but growth became negative since the early 
2000s (Figure 3 and Muňoz, 2006). Between 2000 and 2013, volume of Zimbabwe’s exports fell 
on average by 1.1 percent a year and by 15 percent cumulatively. Marked difference however 
emerged between the pre-reform (2000 - 2008) and post-reform (2009 – 2013) periods (Figure 3a). 
While export volumes declined in cumulative terms by almost 60 percent during the first period, 
they increased by more than 80 percent in the latter. Zimbabwe’s performance boded well relative 
to most regional peers, which were impacted by the global financial crisis. Export post-2008 
growth reflects rebound after years of decline, with slowdown in 2012 and 2013.  
 
Figure 3. Zimbabwe: Export Growth and Share 
 
3a. Export Volumes (Indices, 2000 = 100)  3b. Shares in World Exports (%) 
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 Source: Authors’ calculations based on WTO and IMF WEO databases.  
 
As shown by the country´s low and even declining shares in global exports since 2000, Zimbabwe 
has been facing external competitiveness challenges (Figure 4b). Zimbabwe’s performance in this 
area contrasts that of Africa, which has shown an increase in global share of exports. Low and 
declining export shares have contributed to subdued growth of the aggregate demand and the lack 
of ‘productive’ jobs in the export sectors and their suppliers.  
iii. Diversification of exports 
 
Zimbabwe’s product composition of exports is more diversified than that of most other African 
countries in the region and at comparable level of development (LICs). However, share of mining 
in total Zimbabwe’s exports has risen while the share of manufacturing has fallen over the past ten 
years, reducing the overall value added in exports. Regarding export destinations, South Africa 
has accounted for a disproportionate share of Zimbabwe’s exports, reflecting geographical 
closeness and long-established economic ties (Table 2). 
 
Exports were overly concentrated in low value added primary products, with crude materials 
accounting for more than 40 percent of exports during 2008 – 2012. At the same time, chemical 
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products, machinery and transport equipment accounted for more than half of imports during the 
same period (Statistics Zimbabwe, 2013).4 
 
Table 2. Merchandise Export by Sectors and Destinations in 2012 (% of total exports) 1/ 
  Zimbabwe South Africa Mozambique Zambia 
Agriculture 33.3 9.5 17.8 8.7 
Fuel, mining 36.8 39.3 56.5 78.2 
Manufacturing 21.1 40.2 10.3 12.1 
     
Destination 1 South A. (68.9) EU (20) EU (40.5) Switzerland (48.9) 
Destination 2 UAE (12.4) China (11.7) South A. (19.2) China (16.7) 
Destination 3 Moz. (7.3) US (8.7) China (18.4) South A. (9.3) 
Source: WTO database. 1/ Percent of total exports into the country of destination are in parentheses. 
 
 
c. External price competitiveness  
 
In Zimbabwe, the exchange rate regime has evolved from flexible towards fixed/multicurrency 
regime, as price stabilization and credibility of the monetary policy gained priority.5 
 
The real effective exchange rate (RER) measures the relative price levels (domestic and foreign 
prices expressed in the same currency unit. In this paper, we focus on the bilateral CPI-based real 
exchange rate with South Africa, which is Zimbabwe’s main trading partner. It is defined as 
D
t
F
t
tt
P
P
eRER  where te  denotes $ per South African rand, 
F
tP is the consumer price index of South 
Africa and DtP is the consumer price index of Zimbabwe.
 6  Figure 4a depicts the evolution of this 
bilateral RER with South African rand and its components for the past three decades.  
 
The real exchange rate experienced major real and nominal devaluations (and inflation-devaluation 
spiral) before the 2008 collapse (Hanke and Krus, 2012). The rate appreciated by about 30 percent 
between February 2011 and 2014 (Figure 4). The appreciation has occurred against the background 
of Zimbabwe’s very low and even negative inflation, indicating that weakening of the rand to US$ 
has out-weighted the evolution of the relative prices. It occurred on the back of continued high 
current account deficits and accumulation of net foreign liabilities, i.e. negative net foreign assets, 
but low investment. Against such background, the real appreciations typically imply a loss of 
external competitiveness, unless they are accompanied by improvements in productivity or other 
fundamental such as investment (Rogoff, 2007). Still, as Muňoz (2006) underscored, in Zimbabwe 
other factors such as poor governance or access to credit could limit impact of competitive RER.  
                                                          
4 Due to the lack of data, the discussion in this section focuses on merchandise exports, while export of services is not 
analyzed. As Eichengreen and Gupta (2012) underscore, exports today increasingly encompass services, with modern 
services (e.g., communication, information) being strongly impacted by the RER.  
5 The latest IMF Exchange Rate Report classifies Zimbabwe as having ‘no separate legal tender’.  
6 Since South Africa is Zimbabwe’s main trading partner, rand is used as the foreign currency in what follows.  
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For Zimbabwe’s policymakers, the key issue in this regard is to find out whether the real 
appreciation (i) reflects misalignment (overvaluation) of the RER relative to its equilibrium value 
and (ii) hampers growth and diversification of exports even under the multicurrency regime.7 
 
Figure 4. Zimbabwe: Evolution of the Real Exchange Rate  
 
4a. Real and nominal exchange rate, relative prices 4b. RER and NFA, Jun 2010 – Mar 2014,  
1980 - 2013, annual (log)    Indices, Jan 2010 = 100 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and IMF databases. Note: Relative prices in 
Figure 1a and NFA in Figure 1b are plotted against right-hand scale.  
  
III. Estimating the Real Exchange Rate Misalignments 
 
Computing the real equilibrium rate helps us determine if the movements of the actual RER reflect 
mostly changing fundamentals or deviations from equilibrium levels, i.e. misalignments.  
 
a. Modeling Framework 
 
This section utilizes the stock-flow approach to the long run equilibrium real exchange rate. The 
approach incorporates both the balance-of-payment (e.g., macroeconomic imbalances) and the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect (e.g., relative productivity).8 The equilibrium RER determination is 
linked to the productivity differential (PROD) and to net foreign assets (NFA). This approach is 
suitable for Zimbabwe, which has a large productivity gap with South Africa and the external debt 
overhang. The reduced-form equation becomes (where negative sign is RER appreciation): 
 
 ),(
/
 NFAPRODfRER        (1) 
 
In emerging market and developing economies, the productivity (PROD) increase in the home 
country relative to trading partners typically leads to appreciation of the real exchange rate. In 
                                                          
7 Muňoz (2006) found that while depreciation of the official real exchange rate stimulated exports, parallel rate 
depreciation led to increased smuggling. Among various sectors, mining was the most responsive to RER changes.   
8 Faruqee (1995) first applied this approach to advanced economies and Égert et al. (2004) and Alberola and Navia 
(2007) to transition economies. Brixiová, Égert and Essid (2014) utilized it for economies of North Africa.    
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countries with low international reserves such as Zimbabwe, persistent current account deficits, 
which translate into the stock of net foreign liabilities, tend to generate burden on the external 
account and may require RER depreciation (Annex I). However, if the targeted stock of net foreign 
assets is negative, the capital inflows may lead to RER appreciation.  
 
To confirm that the RER depends mostly on (i) the net foreign assets and (ii) productivity, we 
include control variables in the empirical analysis such as trade openness and investment. 
Equations (1a) and (1b) show equation (1) augmented with these control variables: 
 
),,(
// 
 OPENNFAPRODfRER       (1a) 
),,(
// 
 INVNFAPRODfRER        (1b) 
 
 Openness ( OPEN ) is the share of exports and imports in GDP. An increase in openness can 
lead to either RER appreciation or depreciation, depending on changes in the trade/current 
account balance. The typical interpretation is that tighter trade policy appreciates the RER in 
the long run (Baffes et al., 1997); 
 
 The impact of investment as share of GDP (INV) depends on whether the investment releases 
supply side constraints (and hence raise productivity) in the tradable or non-tradable sector.  
 
Figure 5 shows paths of the RER, NFA and productivity differential during 1980 – 2013, with the 
rapid widening of the productivity gap between Zimbabwe and South Africa from mid-1990s until 
2009 and some turnaround after 2009. The Figure also depicts the rapid accumulation of net 
foreign liabilities during this period, driven by trade and current account deficits.  
 
Figure 5. Zimbabwe: Evolution of RER and its fundamentals, 1980 - 2013 
 
5a. RER, NFA and Prod. Differential  5b. RER and Trade Balance 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB and IMF databases.  
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b. Data and Methodology 
 
The empirical analysis utilizes annual data from 1980 to 2013, obtained from databases of the 
African Development Bank and IMF. Equation (1) is estimated using CPI-deflated real exchange 
rate (RER). PROD is the productivity differential between Zimbabwe and South Africa, measured 
as real GDP per capita. NFA is the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP. Since Zimbabwe accumulated 
major external debt, this ratio is negative (i.e. represents net foreign liabilities). 
 
First, we examine the relation between the real exchange rate and the two core variables, 
productivity (PROD) and net foreign assets (NFA). To check the robustness of results we add the 
openness ratio (OPEN), measured as total trade to GDP; and the investment to GDP ratio (INV).  
 
Given that conventional unit root tests suggest that most of our variables are non-stationary in 
level, we carry out cointegration analysis. The long-term coefficients are estimated using the 
dynamic ordinary least square (DOLS) estimator, developed by Stock and Watson (1993), who 
showed that DOLS accounts for the endogeneity of the regressors and serial correlation in the 
residuals by incorporating lags and leads of the regressors in first differences: 
 
tjti
n
i
k
kj
jiti
n
i
it XXY   
 
  ,
1
,,
1
0
2
1
       (2) 
where k1 and k2 denote, respectively, leads and lags. Their length is determined on the basis of the 
Schwarz, Akaike and Hannan-Quinn information criteria (Annex II).9 
 
c. Estimation Results 
 
The baseline model linking the real exchange rate (RER) to productivity (PROD) and net foreign 
assets (NFA) was estimated using the dynamic OLS (DOLS) approach with one lag to one lead 
(DOLS(1,1)). Additional control variables, namely openness and investment, were added to the 
baseline model. The estimated results of the RER models are in Table 2a.  
 
As a robustness check, we also use the Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) estimator to address the 
potential ‘outliers’ issue.10 This method is well suited for our data, since after 2008 the RER and 
some explanatory variables (NFA) exhibit high volatility. Table 2b shows the results. 
 
The coefficient estimates for the productivity differentials are statistically significant for the 
baseline model and the case with trade openness under both methods (DOLS and LAD). Under 
the LAD, the coefficient is also significant in the case with investment. The coefficients are of the 
expected sign, with a decrease in the productivity differential (i.e. widening productivity gap 
between Zimbabwe and South Africa) implying RER depreciation.11 Our results indicate that in 
the long run, productivity differential has a robust negative relationship with the RER (Table 3a).  
                                                          
9 Since the NFA series is I(2) process, it was de-trended. 
10 Least absolute deviations (LAD) is method that seeks to minimize the influenced of outliers. This type of robust 
regression is also called median regression, which has the advantage of diminishing the influence of the residuals. 
11 In other emerging markets, including new EU members, productivity is a key driver of RER movements. 
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Table 3a. The long-run determinants of the Zimbabwe’s RER (DOLS) 
    
    Specification Baseline With trade openness With investment 
    
    C -15.22243*** -4.796220 -27.74584*** 
 (3.784424) (1.447145) (6.123713) 
LOGDIFF_PROD -7.210599*** -5.717963*** -11.10295*** 
 (3.585306) (4.584548) (7.260829) 
NFA -0.476500 -0.483460 0.002208 
 (1.082305) (1.169024) (0.004887) 
LOGOPEN  -1.820509***  
  (4.442108)  
LOGINV   1.705171** 
   (2.249682) 
AFTER2008 22.22376*** 24.46813*** 20.25245*** 
 (12.11876) (22.13481) (18.97835) 
D2001 1.312620*** 1.073231*** 1.311790*** 
 (5.784610) (4.129982) (6.699468) 
    
    N 30 30 30 
Adjusted R-squared 0.995061 0.997331 0.997500 
Log likelihood -20.79798 -7.102519 -6.085697 
F-statistic 465.9453 660.3460 705.1699 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Source: Authors’ estimates. Note: Figures in brackets are standards deviations of parameters. (*), (**), (***) 
indicate the degree of statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 3b. The long-run determinants of the Zimbabwe’s RER (LAD) 
     
     Specification  Baseline Trade openness Investment  
C -19.93814*** -4.041354 -32.78111***  
 (2.974062) (0.588780) (3.753621)  
LOGDIFF_PROD -9.514373** -4.828717* -12.51211***  
 (2.825623) (1.853604) (4.065186)  
NFA -0.572599 -0.073507 0.234597  
 (0.989866) (0.137325) (0.287630)  
LOGOPEN  -1.520882**   
  (2.452785)   
LOGINV   2.520989*  
   (1.835886)  
AFTER2008 21.04716*** 25.64440*** 19.57730***  
 (9.223663) (10.61416) (10.39960)  
D2001 1.385916* 0.631581 1.110357*  
 (1.797750) (0.867240) (1.959982)  
     
     Adjusted R-squared 0.878212 0.904245 0.890671  
Sparsity 1.492896 1.056508 1.090795  
Prob(Quasi-LR stat) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000  
Source: Authors’ estimates. Note: Figures in brackets are standards deviations of parameters. (*), (**), (***) 
indicate the degree of statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
11 
 
The coefficient estimate for openness is significant and negative under both methods (Table 3a 
and 3b). A greater openness thus leads to a real appreciation of the RER, indicating that the export 
revenues and imports strengthen the domestic tradable sector more than the non-tradable sector. 
In contrast, increased investment leads to RER depreciation, suggesting that it is mostly used to 
release supply-side constraints in non-tradable sectors.  
 
Factors impacting the RER were also estimated with monthly data. Specifically, the productivity 
differential was proxied by (lagged) credit to the private sector (relative to credit in South Africa) 
and prices of key export commodities served as controls. In this case, an increase of credit in 
Zimbabwe relative to South Africa had a positive and statistically significant relation with the 
RER, i.e. credit expansion led to real deprecation of the RER, indicating that credit was geared 
more towards non-tradable sectors (Tables 1 and 2, Annex III).  
 
d. Real Exchange Rate Misalignment  
 
We calculate the misalignment in three steps. First we use data on the nominal exchange rate 
between $ and South African rand as well CPI indexes for Zimbabwe and South Africa to derive 
the bilateral real exchange rate:12  
 
)/ln(ln
D
t
F
ttt PPeRER        (3) 
 
Second, we regress RER  on NFA , PROD , and on control variables ( INVOPEN , ). We also 
introduce dummy variables for structural breaks after the land and currency reforms in 2001 and 
2008. The RER misalignment (as % of the equilibrium rate) is difference between the actual real 
exchange rate (RER) and the long run real equilibrium exchange rate (ERER): 
 
t
tt
t
ERER
ERERRER
ntmisalignme

      (4) 
 
Given our definition of the RER, when misalignment is positive, the RER is undervalued. 
Conversely, when misalignment is below zero, the RER is overvalued. 
 
In both methods (DOLS, LAD), the RER of Zimbabwe was found to be notably overvalued in the 
run up to 2008 crisis (between 70 and 100 percent of the equilibrium real exchange rate during 
2006–2008). The sizeable misalignment in mid 2000s was a side-product of hyperinflation which 
in turn reflected heavy quasi-fiscal activities of the RBZ (Figure 6).  
 
The currency overvaluation w.r.t. rand has re-emerged under the multicurrency regime. 
Specifically, the 2013 RER overvaluation w.r.t. South African rand ranged from 58 to 73 percent 
of the equilibrium real exchange rate. As with any model-based estimation, given the sensitivity 
or parameters and the underlying assumptions, the results should be understood as providing 
                                                          
12 Until 2008, te  was in terms of Zimbabwe dollars per one South Africa rand. After 2008 it was US$ per rand.  
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indication of sizeable overvaluation under the prevailing multi-currency regime relative to 
alternatives rather than the specific level of the real equilibrium exchange rate.13 
 
Figure 6. Zimbabwe: Real Exchange Rate and Its Misalignment, 1980 – 2013 
 
6a. Actual RER and Equilibrium (DOLS)  6b. RER Misalignments (DOLS, baseline)  
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6c. Actual RER and Equilibrium (LAD)  6d. RER Misalignments (LAD, baseline)  
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Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
As a robustness check, misalignment of the actual RER from the equilibrium one was also 
computed with monthly data (Annex III, Figure 1). The currency overvaluation in 2014 ranged 
from 54 percent for the base scenario to 39 percent for the scenario with commodity prices as 
controls, suggesting once again that the Zimbabwean bilateral RER with South Africa has been 
significantly overvalued relative to its long run equilibrium value.    
 
                                                          
13 The overvaluations derived with ARDL method (Figure 3, Annex III) are close to these values of overvaluation.  
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e. Comparison of Results with the Empirical Literature 
 
Results of other studies on the RER misalignment in Zimbabwe are summarized in Table 4. Our 
findings, which point to past periods of sizeable overvaluation as well as a large overvaluation in 
2013, are consistent with finding of other empirical studies on the topic. 
 
Our estimates and the empirical literature suggest that Zimbabwe has been exposed to extended 
periods of sizeable RER overvaluation. With South African as the main trading partner, the 
persistent currency overvaluation has contributed not only to the weak trade balance and depleted 
foreign exchange reserves but also to low growth. Further, we have not found any evidence that 
undervaluation promotes growth. Hence eliminating sizeable RER misalignments – especially 
overvaluation -- is thus a key priority which will require internal devaluation and structural 
reforms. Further, replacing US$ with South African rand is an option to be seriously considered. 
We elaborate on advantages and drawbacks of this step below. 
 
Table 4. RER misalignment in Zimbabwe and its impact — Summary of the literature 
Study & authors Methodology Results 
Ndlela (2012) Behavioural equilibrium exchange rate 
(BEER) 
RER (using ZWE dollar relative to US$ as 
nominal rate) was overvalued up to 95 % in 2003 
– 2004; RER misalignment reduced GDP growth 
Mohapatra (2005) Short run, partial equilibrium approach RER (real effective exchange rate) was 
overvalued by about 50 – 60 % in 2004 - 2005 
Masunda (2011) Fundamental equilibrium exchange 
rate (FEER) /macro balance 
RER misalignment (both under and 
overvaluation) hampers growth  
 
Masunda (2012) 
Fundamental equilibrium exchange 
rate (FEER) /macroeconomic balance  
RER overvaluation was an important factor for 
currency crisis (large depreciation) 
IMF (2014) Macroeconomic balance approach; 
external sustainability approach 
RER is overvalued by 21 -  23 % relative to its 
equilibrium value 
 
IV. Misalignment and Growth  
 
The role of the real exchange rate (e.g. the relative price of tradables to non-tradables) in growth 
and the convergence of incomes of developing countries to those of developed economies remains 
debated. Our paper contributes to this debate with the case of Zimbabwe, a country that 
experienced several currency regimes, major misalignments, and slow economic growth.   
 
Experiences of developing countries indicate that sizeable and protracted overvaluations are 
associated with slow growth (Edwards, 1988; Ghura and Grennes, 1993). What is less clear is 
whether undervaluation promotes growth (Galas and Lucinda, 2006; Rodrik, 2008; Rapetti et al., 
2012), or is neutral/hampers it (Berg and Miao, 2010; Schöder, 2013). Haddad and Pancaro (2010) 
posit that since countries cannot maintain currency undervaluation indefinitely, it can be deployed 
as a growth tool only in the short term. Razin and Collins (1997) find nonlinearity in relation 
between RER misalignment and growth: High overvaluations are associated with lower growth, 
while low to moderate overvaluations tend to be associated with higher growth. However, large 
undervaluation seem to again hamper growth.   
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a. Misalignment and real GDP growth 
 
First, we examine the misalignment – growth nexus in Zimbabwe. We utilize an empirical 
growth equation based on Solow’s growth model, as in Schöder (2013):  
 
tttttttt wgrlanddollarunderoverrgdppcgrowth    lnlnln 211  (5) 
where the dependent variable is real GDP growth (
tgrowth ). The independent variables are the 
initial real GDP per capita, (
1trgdppc ) as the convergence term, the world GDP growth ( twgr ), a 
dummy variable for the multicurrency regime introduced in 2008 ( tdollar ), a dummy variable for 
the 2001 land reform ( tland ), and the idiosyncratic error ( t ). The value of undervaluation (
tunder ) is greater than or equal to zero, while the value of overvaluation ( tover ) is less or equal to 
zero. We also consider some of the RER fundamentals utilized in estimating the equilibrium RER 
(NFA, investment and openness) since they are likely to impact growth.  
 
A key difference of (5) from the approach adopted by, for example, Rodrik (2008) is allowing 
currency undervaluation affect growth differently than overvaluation, that is 
21  . 
Alternatively, misalignment can represent both overvaluation and undervaluation:  
 
ttttttt landdollarwgrntmisalignmergdppcgrowth    lnln 1   (5a) 
 
(5a) assumes that RER undervaluation and overvaluation have equal and opposite impacts on 
growth. Under this assumption, 0 implies that undervaluation raises growth.  
 
Our choice of growth equation (5) reflects the observation that in Zimbabwe, the relation between 
misalignment and growth is non-linear (Figure 7). The real GDP growth (per capita) in Zimbabwe 
is lower under more overvalued currency and higher with undervaluation. The relation is non-
linear (or piece-wise linear) with growth tapering off at higher levels of undervaluation. Overall, 
currency undervaluation is not systematically related to higher growth. 
 
The varied impacts of undervaluation and overvaluation on growth are captured by parameters 1
and 2  (Table 5a). The coefficient estimates of the impact of misalignment on growth, captured 
by parameter  in equation (5a). When examining misalignment only, the results would suggest 
a positive impact of undervaluation on growth (Tables 1a and 1b, Annex IV). When separate 
impacts of undervaluation and overvaluation on growth are considered, the regression exercise 
yields a negative and statistically significant relationship between overvaluation and growth (Table 
3a). Put differently, in Zimbabwe a smaller overvaluation (with RER closer to its equilibrium 
value) is associated with higher growth.  
 
Our estimates point to nonlinearity between misalignment and growth. However, we do not find 
robust evidence that more undervalued currency would be associated with higher growth. While 
the coefficient associated with undervaluation (
2 ) is positive, it is statistically significant only in 
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the baseline but becomes insignificant when various control variables are introduced.14 In fact, 
Zimbabwe experienced some of its highest growth rates when the RER was only slightly 
undervalued (Figure 7).15 These results are robust to various specifications of the basic empirical 
growth equation, with investment ratio, openness and net foreign liabilities as controls. 
 
Figure 7. RER undervaluation and growth 
 
7a. Piece-wise linear fit for overvaluation and udervaluation 
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7b. Nonlinear (quadratic) fit for undervaluation and undervaluation 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: Negative undervaluation represents overvaluation. In Figure 6a, correlation coefficient for 
growth of GDP per capita and overvaluation is 0.5063 (significant at 5%). Correlation coefficient for growth of GDP and 
overvaluation is 0.5375 (significant at 5%).  
                                                          
14 Undervaluation is insignificant also when different estimates of ERER are utilized (Annex II).  
15 Annex IV presents symmetric treatment of misalignment (i.e. both undervaluation and overvaluation would hamper 
growth. In this specification, misalignment is not statistically significant.   
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b. Misalignment and sectoral impacts 
 
Second, we aim to uncover the key channels through which the real exchange rate misalignment 
impacts growth.  The sectoral growth models to be estimated are specified as follows: 
 
tttttttjt wgrlanddollarunderoverrgdppcgr    lnlnlnsec_ 211  (6a) 
 
tttttttjt wgrlanddollarunderoverrgdppccgr    lnlnlnsec_ 211  (6b) 
 
where 
jtgr sec_ represents real growth of the sector j in period t and jtcgr sec_ contribution of 
sector j to the overall growth of GDP at t, where sectors studied are manufacturing, mining and 
agriculture – the main export sectors in Zimbabwe. The other variables are as in Equation (5). 
 
The sectoral decomposition of growth points to different impacts of RER overvaluation and 
undervaluation on key export sectors: mining, manufacturing and agriculture. While overvaluation 
reduces sectoral growth (with the coefficients 
1 positive and statistically significant), 
undervaluation coefficients 
2  – are positive for manufacturing and mining but negative for 
agriculture and are not statistically significant (Table 5b). Among the three sectors examined, 
overvaluation impacts the most growth of the agricultural sector, which accounts for more than 
half of the country’s employment. When the contribution of various sectors to GDP is taken into 
account, the RER overvaluation had a high impact on growth via mining, which generated more 
than 40 percent of the country’s real value added and almost 40 percent of goods exports in 2012. 
Mining has high elasticity of employment to growth, indicating that slowdown of growth in this 
sector leads to relatively (to employment in the sector) high job losses.16   
 
V. Should Zimbabwe Adopt South African Rand? 
 
The ‘optimal’ currency regime for the country has been a widely debated issue. When introduced 
in February 2009, the multicurrency regime was meant to last until 2012. The regime was, with no 
clear timeline for replacement. Even though the regime helped stabilize the economy from 
hyperinflation and stop quasi-fiscal financing, it presents challenges. One of them is persistent real 
exchange rate overvaluation illustrated above, another one is currency mismatch between wages 
and other expenditures payable in dollars and foreign earnings received mostly in rand. In cash 
transactions, shortages of small $ denominations have impeded trade, while South African capital 
account restrictions prevented wider circulation of rand. 
 
Reintroducing the Zimbabwe dollar, while politically appealing on the grounds of national 
independence, raises concerns about credibility of macroeconomic policies, especially given the 
track record associated with the previous use of this currency. Rand meets most preconditions to 
be the anchor currency, (and in most aspects does so better than US$).  Specifically, South Africa 
is Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner, and was the destination for over 2/3 of exports in 2013; (ii) 
labor mobility from Zimbabwe to South Africa is high with more than 10 percent of  
 
                                                          
16  Mining accounted for two percent of employment, but agriculture for more than half (ZimStat, 2006 and 2012). 
17 
 
Table 5a. Real GDP growth and RER under- /overvaluation, OLS  
 
 
Table 5b. Growth of export sectors and RER over/undervaluation (OLS)
Source: Authors’ estimates. Note: Figures in brackets are standards deviations of parameters. (*), (**), (***) 
indicate the degree of statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
(1) Baseline 
Model Eq. 5
(2) (1) with 
Investment (3) (2) with NFL
(4) (2) with 
Openness
(5) (1) with 
land reform
Initial income of ZWE (log) -0.038474 -0.516290** -0.464162** -0.512462** -0.481189*** 
(0.132849) (0.201104) (0.167855) (0.208644) (0.155811)
Global real GDP growth -0.057428 0.065205 0.400298 0.107689 -0.055443
(0.499075) (´0.473567) (0.490335) (0.534447) (0.80763)
Multicurrency regime in 2008 0.081087** -0.061951 -0.00053 -0.058391 0.058387**
(0.035661) (0.055274) (0.065223) (0.062704) (0.025357)
Undervaluation (log) 0.078963* 0.05629 0.028346 0.053356 0.034984
(0.042569) (0.034188) (0.028415) (0.03566) (0.02952)
Overvaluation (log) 0.013276*** 0.007509*** 0.009170*** 0.007475** 0.012163***
(0.001035) (0.001466) (0.001855) (0.001434) (0.000918)
Investment ratio (log) 0.149287*** 0.123648** 0.148245***
(0.047287) (0.050655) (0.049899)
Net foreign liabilities (log) -0.078268
(0.048743)
Openness ratio (log) -0.015618
(0.072818)
Land reform in 2001 -0.108513***
(0.03549)
Constant 0.105639 1.276667** 1.201965*** 1.293983** 1.381420***
(0.37432) (0.525717) (0.426929) (0.516465) (0.446072)
Adjusted R-squared 0.393276 0.555035 0.571955 0.537695 0.595967
F-statistic 5.148462 7.652621 7.108352 6.3169 8.866913
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001917 0.000084 0.000103 0.000247 0.000026
growth contr. growth contr. growth contr.
Initial income of ZWE (log) -0.781036*** -0.05510** -0.879719*** -0.29006*** -1.106820** -0.11202*
(0.215381) (0.02141) (0.213456) (0.08087) (0.469642) (0.06288)
Global real GDP growth -0.403263 -0.03205 -1.435849* -0.4151 -2.413199 -0.171
(0.953999) (0.07418) (0.74181) (0.2802) (2.550639) 0.2179
‘Dollarization’ from 2008 on 0.043685 0.002022 0.030033 0.01434 -0.002116 0.00099
(values 1 or 0) (0.056163) (0.004626) (0.057859) (0.01748) (0.082386) 0.01359
Land reform from 2001 on -0.108105*** -0.007332** -0.087216*** -0.02903** -0.174031** -0.019803**
(values 1 or 0) (0.030614) (0.002906) (0.030526) (0.01098) (0.075871) (0.008537)
Undervaluation (log) 0.044771 0.003862 0.027582 0.01125 -0.104493 -0.00965
(0.03513) 0.003463 (0.02465) (0.01308) (0.080328) (0.01017)
Overvaluation (log) 0.008340*** 0.0005337** 0.011777*** 0.0041939*** 0.021915*** 0.0023859***
(0.000938) (0.0002581) (0.001223) (0.0009749) (0.001891) (0.004)
Constant 2.216262*** 0.15642 2.532622*** 0.8334*** 3.272830** 0.3284*
(0.620762) (0.06126) (0.610764) (0.2314) (1.339753) (0.1799)
Adjusted R-squared 0.446 0.360 0.645 0.617 0.307 0.287
F statistics 5.15 3.90 10.39 9.31 3.29 3.08
Prob. (F-statistics) 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.0159 0.021
Manufacturing Mining Agriculture
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Zimbabwean labor force estimated to reside in South Africa; (iii) Zimbabwe could join SACU and 
tap into its transfer formula which benefits poorer countries (Kramarenko et al., 2010).  
 
To illustrate further the benefits of rand as the transaction currency, a counterfactual exercise was 
carried out with rand as the anchoring currency since 2009. In this situation, the bilateral nominal 
exchange rate with South Africa is equal to one and the RER is driven by the relative prices. The 
counterfactual inflation rate for Zimbabwe under rand as transaction currency is derived as a 
combination of the South African inflation for imports and Zimbabwe’s inflation for non-
tradables: 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡,𝑍𝑊𝐸
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 = (1 + 𝜋𝑡,𝑧𝑤𝐸
𝑁 )𝛼(1 + 𝜋𝑡,𝑧𝑤𝑒
𝑁 )(1 + 𝜋𝑡,𝑆𝐴
𝑇 )1−𝛼, where α=0.423 is the 
share of imports from South Africa in the CPI basket. In this case, the counterfactual RER would 
depreciate only marginally, in contrast to 10 percent appreciation of the actual RER since July 
2011. The overvaluation would also be much lower than under the dollar as the anchor currency 
and would not exceed 3 percent of the equilibrium RER (Figure 2, Annex III).  
 
In addition to substantial benefits of moving to the rand, many of the costs of ´ dollarized´ economy, 
such as the loss of independent monetary and exchange rate policy have already been incurred 
with US$ as the legal tender. Further, with rand as the transaction currency, the currency risk 
would be below the current levels due to reduced currency mismatch. Moreover, if rand becomes 
the main medium of exchange, transaction (currency exchange) costs would fall. Interest rates on 
loans would also likely fall due to reduced risk premium.   
 
One exception to the overall suitability of South African rand for Zimbabwe’s economy has been 
the limited shock synchronization between the two economies. The standard policy 
recommendation for mitigating low synchronization are (i) availability of transfers (as would be 
the case if Zimbabwe joins CMA) and (ii) flexibility of labor and product markets. The low 
business cycle synchronization could be further offset by the high credibility of the South African 
Reserve Bank in conducting monetary policy and its relevance for the region.17  
 
Since Zimbabwe has been using the US$ for over five years, switching to South African rand 
would change little – the country would still not be able to utilize monetary and exchange rate 
policy. The issues related to the lack of synchronization are thus similar. From the perspective of 
South Africa, given Zimbabwe size, admitting it to CMA would not constitute major cost. In fact 
it could help reduce fragility and possibility of costly conflict (Ncube at al., 2013). 
 
In sum, in the case of Zimbabwe, introducing South Africa rand could mean reaping major benefits 
in terms of transaction costs, credibility of monetary policy, regional integration and last but not 
least exchange rate broadly aligned with its equilibrium value. The last point, while more likely 
with South African rand than $, is not automatic -- it is conditioned on Zimbabwe maintaining 
appropriate macroeconomic, and especially fiscal policies. Given the absence of devaluation of 
exchange rate as a policy tool, the country would need to rely more on ‘internal devaluation’ 
                                                          
17 Further, Zimbabwe is poorly synchronized with both South Africa and US (Kramarenko et al., 2010). More 
specifically, empirical evidence indicates that shocks to Zimbabwe’s output have not been correlated with those to the 
US economy. Evidence on output shock correlations of Zimbabwe with South Africa is mixed – shocks appear 
stronger during the relatively stable period of 1990s. Overall, correlation among GDP growth rates of economies in 
Southern Africa in the past three decades has been limited (Basdevant et al., 2014).  
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through containing wage bill to maintain RER competitiveness. Putting in place an enabling 
entrepreneurship framework to support competitiveness and job creation is also critical. 
  
IV. Conclusions 
 
This paper examined suitability of the multicurrency regime for Zimbabwe almost six years after 
its introduction and the challenges this regime has brought about. The approach adopted focused 
on misalignment of the real exchange rate and its implications for growth complements the existing 
literature which examines the issue from the optimal currency area perspective.  
 
More specifically, the real exchange rate misalignment in Zimbabwe was first estimated utilizing 
the stock-flow approach to the real equilibrium exchange rate with both annual data for 1980 – 
2013 and monthly data for January 2009 – March 2014 period, with several empirical methods. 
The main finding was that the country experienced persistent periods of sizeable real exchange 
rate misalignment, in particular overvaluation, both in the run up to 2008 crisis and under the 
current multicurrency regime anchored in US$. The misalignment has an asymmetric impact on 
growth: while overvaluation reduces growth of GDP as well as growth and employment in export 
sectors, we have not found robust evidence that undervaluation would increase it. Hence in 
Zimbabwe the real exchange rate does not appear to be a policy tool that could drive growth.  
 
Regarding the current overvaluation, nominal exchange rate (e.g., external) devaluation is not 
feasible under the multicurrency arrangement. Zimbabwe thus needs to rely on internal 
devaluation, in particular fiscal expenditure control and management of the public wage bill, as 
well structural reforms that would raise the economy’s flexibility. Creating an environment 
conducive to foreign investment inflows is critical for avoiding liquidity shortages.  
 
The multicurrency regime served Zimbabwe well for stabilizing the economy. Nevertheless, with 
the weakening of the South African rand relative to the US$, correcting for currency overvaluation 
and preventing in the future will be challenging. Rather than relying on internal devaluation which 
is politically costly to introduce, Zimbabwe could replace the multicurrency regime, anchored in 
US$, with rand as the sole transaction currency. The rand meets the criteria of the optimum 
currency area better than the US$. Given the track record of South African monetary policy, 
credibility of this arrangement would be also strong, provided appropriate fiscal policies are 
implemented. Besides preventing reoccurrence of the past sizeable overvaluations of the RER, and 
hence boosting the export and GDP growth, adopting rand would facilitate financial integration. 
All these factors are key for resolving the debt issue as well as for raising growth and living 
standards of the population.   
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ANNEX I. STOCK-FLOW APPROACH TO THE REAL EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATE18 
 
The stock-flow model encompasses the balance of payments and Balassa-Samuelson approach to 
the real equilibrium exchange rate. Besides productivity differentials, the RER in the long run is 
driven by NFA adjustment towards its targeted position. The stock-flow approach decomposes the 
RER into: (i) RER for tradables (the nominal exchange rate and the ratio of foreign and domestic 
tradable prices) and (ii) the ratio of domestic to foreign relative price of non-tradables: 
 
 )***)(1())(1())*(( TNTTNTTT ppppppeq       (1AI) 
 
where q denotes the real exchange rate, e is the nominal exchange rate,  *)( is the share of 
tradable goods in the domestic (foreign) CPI; 
T
p )*(
T
p  is the domestic (foreign) price of 
tradables, and )*(
NTNT
pp is the domestic (foreign) relative price of non-tradables. The second 
term in (1AI) shows changes in the RER due to different developments in prices of non-tradable 
goods relative to prices of tradable goods in the home and foreign country. In this definition, an 
increase (decrease) in q represents real depreciation (appreciation) of the domestic currency.  
 
Focusing on the long-run external equilibrium (i.e. abstracting from short-term capital flows and 
business cycles) the change in net foreign assets can be described as: 
 
NFAryyTBCABNFA **)(          (2AI) 
 
where NFA is net foreign assets, TB is trade balance, *r is the world real interest rate, and CAB is 
the current account balance. The first component of (2AI) is the trade account and the second is 
the interest income from NFA, where the trade balance depends on the productivity differential 
between the home and foreign country. Under the uncovered real interest rate parity condition 
(where the difference between domestic and foreign real interest rates is the expected change in 
the real exchange rate), the path of NFA towards their targeted level, DNFA , is described by: 
 
)()(*)()( qENFANFArrNFANFANFA
DDD       (3AI) 
 
where DNFA can be interpreted as capital account, r is the real interest at domestic markets and 
0,  . Since over the long term NFANFA D  and 0NFA in the steady state, combining 
(2AI) and (3AI) yields the following long-run RER, 
lt
q  
 
lt
qNFAryyTB  **)(          (4AI) 
 
The RER is linked to the productivity differential yy   (PROD) and to NFA:  
),(
/
 NFAPRODfRER          (5AI) 
        
                                                          
18 Faruqee (1995) first applied this approach to advanced economies and Égert et al. (2004) and Alberola and Navia 
(2007) to transition economies. Brixiová, Égert and Essid (2014) utilized it for economies of North Africa.    
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ANNEX II. UNIT ROOT AND STATIONARITY TESTS 
 
Table 1. Stationarity tests (Augmented Dickey Fuller, ADF): 1980-2013 
          
          
 
Series 
LOGDIFF_PR
OD 
LOGGC_
GDP LOGOPEN LOGRER LOGTOT INV 
NFA TRADE 
BALANCE 
Level No trend -0.581 -2.184 -1.336  0.171 -2.035 -1.431  6.462 -0.460 
Trend -1.535 -3.083 -3.819 -0.955 -2.662 -1.262   4.219 -1.696 
1st 
difference 
No trend -3.956*** -4.767*** -6.096*** -4.509*** -3.205*** -5.156*** -0.3234   -6.373*** 
Trend -4.000*** -4.693*** -5.908*** -4.753*** - -5.239*** -2.358 -3.830** 
2nd 
difference 
No trend - - - - - - -8.258*** - 
Trend - - - - - - -8.626*** - 
          
          
 
 
Table 2. Conclusion ADF test 
         
          
Series 
LOGDIFF_PR
OD 
LOGGC_G
DP LOGOPEN LOGRER LOGTOT 
INV 
NFA 
Level No trend  Unit root Unit root Unit root  Unit root  Unit root  Unit root  Unit root 
 Trend Unit root Unit root Unit root  Unit root  Unit root  Unit root  Unit root 
1st difference No trend Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Unit root 
 Trend Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Unit root 
2nd difference No trend - - - - -  Stationary 
 Trend - - - - -  Stationary 
         
         
 
Table 3. Stationarity tests (Philip Perron, PP): 1980-2013 
          
          
 
Series LOGPROD 
LOG 
GC_GDP LOGOPEN LOGRER LOGTOT INV 
NFA TRADE 
BALANCE 
Level No trend -0.551 -2.290 -1.068 -0.055 -1.671 -1.747   4.419 -0.472 
Trend -1.595 -2.345 -3.891** -1.030 -2.586 -1.598 3.022 -1.659 
1st 
difference 
No trend -4.022*** -5.138*** -7.834*** -4.465*** -6.198*** -5.176*** -1.083 -6.335*** 
Trend -4.082** -4.982*** -7.696*** -4.852*** -6.166*** -5.251*** -2.200 -6.733*** 
2nd 
difference 
No trend - - - - - - -8.257*** - 
Trend - - - - - - -10.397*** - 
          
          
 
 
Table 4. Conclusion Philip-Perron test 
        
         Series LOGDIFF_PROD LOGGC_GDP LOGOPEN LOGRER LOGTOT NFA 
Level No trend  Unit root Unit root Unit root  Unit root Unit root  Unit root 
 Trend Unit root Unit root Unit root  Unit root Unit root  Unit root 
1st difference No trend Stationary Stationary Stationary Unit root Stationary Unit root 
 Trend Stationary Stationary Stationary Unit root Stationary Unit root 
2nd difference No trend - - - Stationary - Stationary 
 Trend - - - Stationary - Stationary 
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ANNEX III. ESTIMATING THE EQUILIBRIUM RER WITH MONTHLY DATA 
 
Table 1, Annex III. Determinants of ERER (monthly data): DOLS 
    
    Variable B1 B2 B3 
    
    C 4.057742*** 5.169584*** 4.405097** 
 (0.201107) (0.953598) (1.620099) 
NFA100 -0.005081 -0.036313 -0.068072 
 (0.049229) (0.050403) (0.057713) 
LOGRELATIVE_CREDIT 0.216422*** 0.091572** 0.090169** 
 (0.043395) (0.040966) (0.043233) 
LOGTOBACCO price  -0.271217 -0.115913 
  (0.193035) (0.337751) 
LOGCOTTON price  0.151523*** 0.159722*** 
  (0.032803) (0.037021) 
    
    Seasonal dummies NO NO YES 
Number lag/lead short run 
dynamics 1 1 1 
Adjusted R-squared 0.683230 0.801658 0.790838 
F-statistic 22.20917 18.03328 9.579919 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
    
    
 
Table 2, Annex III. Determinants of ERER (monthly data): LAD 
    
    Variable B1 B2 B3 
    
    C 4.020831*** 4.551734** 3.717184* 
 (0.318295) (1.702828) (2.114121) 
NFA100 -0.018193 -0.031893 -0.107188 
 (0.078026) (0.106421) (0.104726) 
LOGRELATIVE_CREDIT 0.221207*** 0.108168* 0.101636 
 (0.066149) (0.064726) (0.061815) 
LOGTOBACCO price  -0.141998 0.027457 
  (0.356221) (0.440625) 
LOGCOTTON price  0.138598** 0.149759** 
  (0.058529) (0.058148) 
    
    Seasonal dummies NO NO YES 
Number lag/lead short run dynamics 1 1 1 
Adjusted Pseudo R-squared 0.431899 0.521793 0.500662 
Sparsity 0.162093 0.119459 0.097756 
Prob(Quasi-LR stat) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
    
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 1, Annex III. Zimbabwe: Real Exchange Rate Misalignment, Jan 2009 – March 2014 
 
1a. Actual RER and Equilibrium (DOLS)  1b. RER Misalignments (DOLS)  
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Source: Authors’ Calculations based on the data of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.  
 
Figure 2, Annex III. Real exchange rate misalignment under rand as transaction currency 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.  
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ANNEX IV. MISALIGNMENT AND GROWTH 
 
Table 1, AIV. Empirical evidence (OLS) on growth impacts of undervaluation in Zimbabwe  
Dependent variable: Real GDP growth in Zimbabwe 
 
 
Baseline model 
(Eq. 5a) – (1) 
(1) With inv. 
Ratio – (2) 
(2) With 
NFL (3) 
(3) With 
openness –(4) 
     
     
Initial income of ZWE (log) 0.028641 -0.498271** -0.083512 0.008008 
 (0.135551) (0.216205) (0.122029) (0.130769) 
Global real GDP growth -0.153574 0.003278 0.563468 0.227089 
 (0.609319) (0.550886) (0.458317) (0.643961) 
Multicurrency regime introduced 
in 2008 (values 1 or 0) 0.082325** -0.070245 0.146693*** 0.102294** 
 (0.039283) (0.058764) (0.039246) (0.043118) 
Undervaluation (log) 0.014051*** 0.007701*** 0.014561*** 0.013172*** 
 (0.001554) (0.001508) (0.000976) (0.001409) 
Investment ratio (log)  0.158882***   
  (0.047664)   
Net foreign liabilities (log)   -0.139006**  
   (0.051367)  
Openness ratio (log)    -0.124497 
    (0.102618) 
Constant -0.063830 1.228889** 0.309634 0.201354 
 (0.389891) (0.567486) (0.351482) (0.441990) 
     
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.355830 0.538460 0.497315 0.367709 
F-statistic 5.419084 8.466607 7.331626 4.721924 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.002322 0.000064 0.000188 0.003156 
     
     
Source: Authors’ estimates. Note: Figures in brackets are standards deviations. (*), (**), (***) indicate the degree of 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
 
The empirical equation for estimating the relationship between undervaluation and growth in 
Zimbabwe is a modified version of Rodrik (2008) and is specified in equation (5a). In Table 1b of 
this Annex, we added land reform of 2001 as one of the independent variables, as a robustness 
check. Coefficients on undervaluation are positive and statistically significant in all specifications 
of the model. However, and as discussed in the text, the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient on undervaluation (where negative undervaluation is overvaluation) needs to be 
interpreted with caution and should not lead to concluding that undervaluation would encourage 
growth in Zimbabwe. Dividing the misalignment variable into over- and under-valuation reveals 
that only coefficient associated with overvaluation is both positive and statistically significant (i.e., 
reducing overvaluation would stimulate growth).  
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